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DEFINING THE ROLE OF DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONS
UNDER SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT:
CENTAUR COMMUNICATIONS v. AISIM
COMMUNICATIONS
In 1946 Congress enacted the Lanham Act to protect the good will of
trademark holders, to prevent the diversion of trade through misrepresen-
tation, and to protect the public against deceptive trademarks.1 Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act imposes civil liability upon any person who uses, for
commercial purposes, a false designation of origin or any false description
or representation of goods or services.2 Courts have determined that Con-
1. See The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (protecting good will of
trademark holders, precluding misrepresentation, and protecting public against deception); S.
REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274, 1275-
77 (stating purposes of Lanham Trademark Act). The House Report accompanying H.R. 1654,
which Congress subsequently enacted as the Lanham Trademark Act, states that H.R. 1654
attempts to simplify trademark practice. See H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)
(providing for registration and protection of trademarks that persons use in commerce). The
House Report explains that protecting trademarks originally was entirely a state matter and
that the right to a mark was a common-law right. Id. at 4. The House Report further explains
that many states had changed the common-law of trademarks with the possible result that the
number of different varieties of trademark common law may correspond with the number of
states. Id. As a result, the House Report recognized that a person's rights in a trademark in
one state may have differed widely from the trademark rights that a person enjoyed in another
state. 1d. The House Report stated that, because trade is no longer local but is national, marks
that persons use in interstate commerce properly are the subject of federal regulation. Id.
Accordingly, the House Report concludes that a sound public policy concerning trademark
law should ensure that trademarks receive strong federal protection. Id.; see Thompson Medical
Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 215 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that central purpose of
trademark bill is to make choice between competing goods possible by enabling buyers to
distinguish between goods); Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735 F.2d 450, 457 (lth Cir.
1984) (stating that Congress, in enacting Lanham Act, intended to simplify trademark practice,
to establish uniform regulation of trademarks, and to provide greatest protection possible for
all trademarks that persons use in interstate commerce). See generally Callman, The New
Trade-Mark Act of July S, 1946, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 929-30 (1946) (discussing legislative
history of Lanham Act); Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First
Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1029, 1032-39 (1957)
(same); Note, Consumer Meets Computer: An Argument for Liberal Trademark Protection of
Computer Hardware Configurations Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 44
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 283, 293-94 (1987) (same).
2. See The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 78-489, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 441
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982)) (protecting trademarks against false representation
and false designation of origin). Congress, in enacting § 43(a), intended to protect the public
from confusion regarding the source of commercial goods and services. See Thompson Medical
Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing purposes of § 43(a) of Lanham
Act). No congressional committee report from the year of the Lanham Act's enactment
addresses § 43(a). See SEN. REP. No. 1333, supra note 1, at 1274-78 (discussing purposes of
Lanham Act while failing to address specifically § 43(a)). Accordingly, the legislative history
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gress, in enacting section 43(a), established four shifting levels of trademark
protection.3 On one level, courts have determined that section 43(a) protects
unregistered trademarks that describe the qualities or characteristics of a
good or service (descriptive trademarks). 4 Courts agree that, to bring a
of § 43(a) is sparse. See id. (failing to discuss purposes of § 43(a) of Lanham Act). One
commentator, however, argues that the general goals of the Lanham Act best define the
purpose and scope of § 43(a). See Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should
Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. Rav. 671, 679 (1984)
(analyzing purpose of § 43(a) of Lanham Act). The commentator interprets the Lanham Act
as having the purposes of protecting the public from confusion concerning the source of a
product and protecting owners of trademarks from misappropriation by pirates. Id. at 680
n.42.
3. See, e.g., Nutri/System v. Con-Stan Indus., 809 F.2d 601, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1987)
(identifying four different categories of trademark protection under Lanham Act); 20th Century
Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976) (same). Courts recognize that, in enacting § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress
did not intend to protect generic terms, but rather intended to protect descriptive trademarks
that have acquired secondary meaning, suggestive trademarks, and fanciful or arbitrary
trademarks. See S.S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet, 598 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1979)
(identifying four categories of trademarks that Congress intended to protect under § 43(a));
Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1216 (1980); Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9-11 (same). The Second Circuit has defined a
generic term as a term that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species.
See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9-11 (defining generic term). For example, a court has determined
that the term "aspirin" is generic. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1921). Courts have determined that a term constitutes a descriptive trademark if the term
literally describes the product or if the term describes the purpose or utility of the product.
See 20th Century, 747 F.2d at 88 (stating that mark is descriptive if mark describes product
or describes purpose or utility of product); see also 3 R. CALu, mA, TBE LAw op UNFnm
CompEiioN, TRaDAic&sis AND MoNopoLs § 18.05, at 28-41 (L. Altman 4th ed. 1983) (listing
marks that courts have held as descriptive trademarks); infra note 4 and accompanying text
(discussing descriptive trademarks). In determining that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects
suggestive trademarks, one federal district court has explained that a trademark is suggestive
if the trademark requires imagination, thought, and perception to reach a conclusion as to the
nature of goods. See Stix Products v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defining term "suggestive trademark"); see also General Shoe Corp. v.
Rosen, 111 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940) (stating that suggestive mark requires imagination on
part of observer), reh'g denied, 112 F.2d 561. For example, the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board of the Patent and Trademark Office has held that the mark "Air-Care" constitutes a
suggestive trademark because the mark requires imagination to understand the nature of the
mark holder's services, which was preventive maintenance services for medical anesthesia and
inhalation equipment. Airco, Inc. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
832, 835-36 (1977). Finally, courts apply the term "fanciful" to a word that a person invents
solely for the word's use as a trademark and apply the term "arbitrary" if a person applies
a common word in an unfamiliar way solely for the word's use as a trademark. See
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 n.12 (stating that courts apply term "fanciful" to word invented
solely for word's use as trademark); Blazon, Inc. v. Blazon Mobile Homes Corp., 416 F.2d
598, 599 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding term "Blazon" as arbitrary trademark because term neither
described nor suggested mark holder's products); Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc.,
350 F.2d 609, 611 n.2 (7th Cir. 1965) (defining "fanciful" mark as coined term that person
devises for purpose of identifying product or service).
4. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)
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successful descriptive trademark infringement suit under section 43(a), a
plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff's trademark has acquired secondary
meaning5 and that the defendant's trademark is likely to confuse consumers
as to the source of the defendant's products.6 Courts, however, have
(noting that Lanham Act protects "merely descriptive" marks that have acquired secondary
meaning); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 326-33
(1938) (common law provides protection for descriptive term that has acquired secondary
meaning), reh'g denied, 305 U S. 675 (1939); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that Lanham Act protects merely descriptive
terms that have acquired secondary meaning). Courts have defined descriptive trademarks as
words that directly convey the characteristics, functions, or qualities of a product to a person
who is unfamiliar with that product. See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753
F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining that marks which describe product's use are descriptive);
Application of American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, Inc., 442 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A.
1971) (stating that mark is descriptive if mark immediately conveys thought of owner's goods
or services); Stix Products v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (stating that, to determine whether a term is descriptive, court should consider whether
word conveys characteristics, functions, qualities, or ingredients of product to person who
never has seen product and does not know what product is). One commentator has noted that
courts have determined that the following marks constitute descriptive trademarks: "Bufferin"
buffered aspirin; "Chap Stick" skin protection in a stick; "Holiday Inn" motel; "Raisin-
Bran" raisin and bran cereal; and "Yellow Pages" classified telephone directory. See 1 J.T.
McCRTnHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNi'.An ComPrToN § 11:8, at 449-53 (2d ed. 1984) (listing
marks that courts have held descriptive).
5. See, e.g., American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communica-
tions & Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that plaintiff must prove
secondary meaning if plaintiff's mark is descriptive); Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
753 F.2d 208, 213 n.9 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that courts must first determine whether mark
has acquired secondary meaning and, therefore, is eligible for protection); Perfect Fit Indus.
v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that courts protect
descriptive trademark only if mark has acquired secondary meaning). Courts have adopted
different definitions of the term secondary meaning. Compare 20th Century Wear, Inc. v.
Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 815 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating secondary meaning exists if
purchasing public associates goods carrying particular mark with single, anonymous source)
with Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(stating secondary meaning exists if primary significance of term in minds of consuming public
is not product but producer). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
defined secondary meaning simply as a consumer's association of a mark with a producer.
See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970) (defining
secondary meaning). In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has stated that descriptive
trademarks acquire secondary meaning if the primary significance of the term in the minds of
the consuming public is not the product but the producer. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (stating that secondary meaning attaches to descriptive trademark if
primary significance of term to consumers is producer not product), reh'g denied, 305 U.S.
674 (1938). The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines secondary meaning as occurring when
consumers add a subsequent significance to a previous meaning of a term so that the subsequent
significance becomes in the market the term's usual and primary significance. See REsTATEmENT
(SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 720 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) (discussing when trademarks
acquire secondary meaning).
6. See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that ultimate inquiry in trademark infringement actions is whether purchasers are likely
to confuse source of plaintiff's and defendant's goods); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry
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considered different sets of factors to determine whether a plaintiff's trade-
mark has acquired secondary meaning' and whether the defendant's trade-
mark confuses consumers.8 In Centaur Communications v. A/S/M
Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); 20th Century
Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that district
court should consider likelihood of consumer confusion once court has determined whether
secondary meaning has attached to plaintiff's mark), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); see
also infra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing factors that courts use to determine
likelihood of confusion).
7. Compare American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communica-
tions & Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549 (lth Cir. 1987) (analyzing four factors to
determine secondary meaning) with Security Center, Ltd. v. First Nat'l Security Centers, 750
F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1985) (analyzing five factors to determine whether secondary meaning
has attached to plaintiffs mark) and Transgo, Inc. v. AJAC Transmission Parts Corp., 768
F.2d 1001, 1015 (9th Cir. 1985) (analyzing four factors to determine whether mark had achieved
secondary meaning), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986). For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has considered the following factors to determine the
existence of secondary meaning: the length and manner of a plaintiff's use of a mark; the
nature and extent of a plaintiffs advertising, promotion, and sales; a plaintiff's efforts to
promote conscious connection in the public's mind between the name of the plaintiff's product
or business and the plaintiffs product or business; and the extent to which the public actually
identifies a mark with a plaintiffs product or venture. American Television, 810 F.2d at 1549.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has considered the
following factors to determine the existence of secondary meaning: survey evidence; length
and manner of a plaintiff's use of a mark; the nature and extent of a plaintiff's advertising
and promotion of a mark; the volume of sales; and instances of actual confusion. Security
Center, 750 F.2d at 1301. Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has analyzed the following factors to find secondary meaning: whether actual purchasers
of a product bearing a claimed trademark associate the trademark with the producer; the
degree and manner of a plaintiff's advertising under a claimed trademark; the length and
manner of a plaintiff's use of a claimed trademark; and whether use of a claimed trademark
has been exclusive. Transgo, 768 F.2d at 1015. Courts have not established a uniform test to
determine whether a trademark has acquired secondary meaning. See Co-Rect Products, Inc.
v. Marvyl Advertising Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating test of
secondary meaning is not uniform among circuits). Courts generally agree that a uniform test
is difficult to establish because no precise guidelines are applicable to a secondary meaning
determination and no single factor is determinative of whether secondary meaning has attached
to a mark. See Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 217 (noting that no single factor is deter-
minative in analyzing existence of secondary meaning); American Footwear Corp. v. General
Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that no single factor is determinative
in proving secondary meaning), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980). But see M. Kramer Mfg.
Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 450 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding existence of secondary meaning
from single factor of intentional copying); see infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text
(criticizing M. Kramer court's finding of secondary meaning on finding of intentional copying).
Accordingly, courts stress that a court must decide trademark infringement cases on the facts.
See American Footwear, 609 F.2d at 663 (stating that courts must decide cases involving
secondary meaning on cases' own facts); Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341
F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (stating that courts cannot apply precise guidelines in
determining whether secondary meaning has attached to mark).
8. Compare Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873-
76 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying eight factors to determine likelihood of confusion) with Squirtco
v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (considering six factors to determine
likelihood of confusion) and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th
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Communications9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
employed separate comprehensive multifactor tests to determine whether
secondary meaning had attached to the title of the plaintiff's marketing
magazine and whether the defendant's use of the title was likely to confuse
consumers as to the source of the defendant's magazines.' 0
In Centaur the plaintiff, Centaur Communications (Centaur), published
a weekly business magazine entitled Marketing Week and the defendant,
A/S/M Communications (A/S/M), published a weekly business magazine
entitled ADWEEK's Marketing Week." Since Centaur began publishing
Marketing Week in 1978, Centaur had concentrated Marketing Week on
the British market, where Marketing Week's subscriber-base numbered
36,000.12 Beginning in 1978, however, Centaur distributed Marketing Week
in the United States, and by 1986 Marketing Week had 110 subscribers in
the United States. 3 A/S/M entered the United States business magazine
market in 1978 by acquiring three regional advertising publications and
changing the publications' titles to ADWEEK.4 During the late 1970s and
early 1980s A/S/M acquired other publishing companies that published
regional advertising magazines.15 Moreover, in mid-1985 A/S/M began
publishing a national marketing edition of ADWEEK titled ADWEEK
Cir. 1985) (considering seven factors to determining whether likelihood of confusion exists).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has applied the following factors
to determine likelihood of confusion: the strength of a plaintiff's mark; the degree of similarity
between a plaintiff's and a defendant's marks; the proximity of the products; the likelihood
that the plaintiff will enter the market in which the defendant is operating; evidence of actual
confusion; a defendant's good faith in adopting the mark; and the sophistication of the
relevant buyers. Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 873-76. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit has considered the following factors to determine the existence of likelihood
of confusion: the strength of an owner's mark; the similarity between an owner's mark and
an alleged infringer's mark; the degree to which a plaintiff's and a defendant's products
compete with each other; an alleged infringer's intent to "pass off" the infringer's goods as
those of the trademark owner; incidents of actual confusion; and the type of product, the
product's costs, and the conditions of purchase. Squirtco, 628 F.2d at 1091. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has analyzed the following factors as
relevant to the existence of likelihood of confusion: the strength or weakness of the marks;
the similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning; the class of goods in question; the marketing
channels used; evidence of actual confusion; the type of goods and the degree of care a
purchaser exercises; and the defendant's intent. Levi Strauss, 778 F.2d at 1360. See generally
RESTATEMmNT OF ToRTs §§ 729, 730, 731 (1938) (discussing factors relevant to determination
of whether consumers are likely to confuse source of plaintiff's and defendant's goods).
9. 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987).
10. Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1219 (2d Cir.
1987).
11. Id. at 1219.
12. Id.
13. Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 652 F. Supp. 1105, 1108
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir.).
14. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1219.
15. Id. In Centaur by 1986 A/S/M was publishing six regional editions of ADWEEK.
Id. A/S/M aimed each of these regional editions towards advertising agency executives, which
A/S/M considered the primary consumer of A/S/M's publications. Id.
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National Marketing Edition.16 In September 1986, however, A/S/M changed
the title of AD WEEK National Marketing Edition to AD WEEK's Marketing
Week.17 Shortly thereafter, Centaur brought a trademark infringement suit
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act against A/S/M in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.' s
In Centaur's trademark infringement suit against A/S/M, Centaur
alleged that the title of A/S/M's magazine "ADWEEK's Marketing Week"
infringed on Centaur's unregistered trademark "Marketing Week" and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the district court.' 9 Centaur
argued that Centaur's mark "Marketing Week" had acquired secondary
meaning and that A/S/M's appropriation of Centaur's mark confused
consumers as to the source of A/S/M's magazine. 20 In response, A/S/M
argued that Centaur's mark had not acquired secondary meaning in the
United States 21 and that traditional judicial analysis indicated that consumers
would not confuse the source of ADWEEK's Marketing Week and Mar-
keting Week.22 A/S/M explained that, because consumers of A/S/M's and
Centaur's publications are highly sophisticated and knowledgeable marketing
executives, consumers would not confuse Centaur's British publication and
A/S/M's American publication.? Following a bench trial on the merits, the
district court determined that A/S/M had violated the Lanham Act by using
the mark "ADWEEK's Marketing Week" on A/S/M's weekly business
magazine.2 Accordingly, the district court restrained A/S/M from displaying
on A/S/M's cover the mark "Marketing Week" either alone or with the
word "ADWEEK's" occupying a significantly lesser percentage of the entire
16. Id. In Centaur A/S/M's ADWEEK National Marketing Edition differed from A/S/
M's six regional editions. Id. A/S/M directed ADWEEK National Marketing Edition to
corporate marketing executives and employees responsible for marketing their employers'
products or services. Id. In contrast, A/S/M directed its regional publications to advertising
agency executives. Id.
17. Id.
18. Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 652 F. Supp. 1105, 1107
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir.)
19. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1219.
20. Brief for Appellee at 17, Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830
F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-7008). In bringing the trademark infringement action against
A/S/M in Centaur, Centaur thought that Centaur's consumers would buy ADWEEK's Mar-
keting Week in the mistaken belief that the consumers were buying Marketing Week. Id.
21. Brief for Appellant at 15, Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830
F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-7008).
22. Id. at 34.
23. Id. at 35.
24. Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 652 F. Supp. 1105, 1114
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir.). Prior to determining that Centaur had a
protectible interest in the mark "Marketing Week," the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Centaur denied Centaur's request for preliminary injunctive
relief. Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 649 F. Supp. 74, 75 (S.D.N.Y
1986). The district court explained that Centaur did not establish with reasonable certainty
that Centaur's mark "Marketing Week" had acquired secondary meaning in the United States.
Id.
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logo and enjoined A/S/M from using the title "Marketing Week" without
a license from Centaur.Y Maintaining that A/S/M's use of the mark
"Marketing Week" did not violate the Lanham Act, A/S/M appealed the
district court's decision to the Second Circuit. 26
On appeal the Second Circuit considered whether the Lanham Act
protects unregistered titles of business publications.27 Noting that section
43(a) of the Lanham Act proscribes "false designation of origin" of goods
and services, the Second Circuit initially recognized that section 43(a) is the
only section of the Lanham Act that protects unregistered trademarks. 21
The Second Circuit, however, explained that section 43(a) does not provide
the same degree of protection to all trademarks. 29 After determining that
Centaur's mark "Marketing Week" constituted an unregistered descriptive
trademark, 0 the Second Circuit stated that, to bring a successful descriptive
trademark infringement suit under section 43(a), Centaur must prove that
Centaur's mark acquired secondary meaning and that A/S/M's use of
"ADWEEK's Marketing Week" was likely to confuse consumers as to the
source of A/S/M's publication.3 ' The court explained that, in analyzing the
existence of secondary meaning, a court examines whether the owner of the
mark has acquired a protectible interest in the mark.32 The court further
explained that, in examining the existence of likelihood of confusion, a
25. Centaur, 652 F. Supp. at 1124-25. In addition to restraining A/S/M from using the
mark "Marketing Week" and from enjoining A/S/M from using the title "Marketing Week"
without a license from Centaur, the district court in Centaur required A/S/M to publish a
prominent notice in A/S/M's next three issues that explained why A/S/M had stopped using
the title "Marketing Week." Id. at 1126. Furthermore, the district court required A/S/M to
explain that A/S/M's publication was not connected to Centaur's publication. Id.
26. Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1219 (2d Cir.
1987). In Centaur A/S/M initially requested the Second Circuit to issue an order expediting
A/S/M's appeal of the district court's decision and for a stay pending appeal. Id. at 1220.
The Second Circuit expedited the appeal and stayed that portion of the district court's decree
that required "ADWEEK's" to appear in comparable size lettering to and in conjunction with
"Marketing Week" on A/S/M's cover. Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing
district court's decree in Centaur). Moreover, the Second Circuit permitted A/S/M, subject to
certain conditions, to utilize advertising and promotional materials without the word "AD-
WEEK's" appearing in comparable size to and in conjunction with "Marketing Week."
Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1220. The Second Circuit also stayed the district court's requirement
that A/S/M give notice to A/S/M's subscribers. Id. Finally, the Second Circuit set the sum
of $10,000 as liquidated damages should the Second Circuit affirm the district court's finding
that A/S/M had infringed Centaur's mark "Marketing Week." Id.
27. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1220.
28. Id.; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing § 43(a) of Lanham Act's
protection of trademarks against false designation of origin).
29. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1220.
30. Id. at 1220-21. On appeal to the Second Circuit, A/S/M in Centaur argued that
"Marketing Week" is a generic mark and, therefore, is not a protectible mark under the
Lanham Act. Id. Noting that the parties did not dispute the district court's finding that the
mark "Marketing Week" was descriptive, the Second Circuit refused to question the district
court's finding. Id.
31. Id. at 1221.
32. Id.
19891
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:335
court considers whether another person has infringed that protected inter-
est. 3
3
After recognizing that section 43(a) protects unregistered descriptive
trademarks that have acquired secondary meaning and that are likely to be
confused with the defendant's mark, the Second Circuit identified separate
multifactor tests for determining secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion.3 4 The Second Circuit initially explained that, to establish second-
ary meaning in a trademark infringement suit under section 43(a), a plaintiff
must show that a significant segment of the public that consumes the
plaintiff's product recognizes an association between the plaintiff's product
and the plaintiff.3 5 The court considered the following six factors to deter-
mine whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning: (1) advertising
expenditures; (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source; (3) unso-
licited media coverage of the product that bears the mark; (4) sales success
of the plaintiff's product; (5) the defendant's intentional copying of the
mark; and (6) the length and exclusivity of the plaintiff's use of the mark.
36
The court emphasized that the plaintiff does not have to prove all six
factors and that no single factor determines whether a mark has acquired
secondary meaning.
37
After identifying the factors for determining whether an unregistered
trademark has acquired secondary meaning, the Second Circuit concluded
that Centaur's mark "Marketing Week" had acquired a secondary meaning
in a substantial segment of the relevant consuming public.3 Adopting the
district court's determination that business executives in the international
marketing and advertising community in the United States constituted the
relevant consuming public of Centaur's product, the Centaur court reasoned
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1222-29.
35. Id. at 1221. In Centaur the Second Circuit explained that a mark acquires secondary
meaning if the mark identifies not only the goods that bear the mark but the source of the
goods. Id. Moreover, the court emphasized that a court's secondary meaning analysis should
focus on the segment of the public that consumes the product that bears the plaintiff's mark.
Id. The Centaur court stressed that, although the owner of the mark strives to create a
secondary meaning for the mark owner's product, the consuming public determines whether
the mark owner's eff6rt has succeeded in creating a secondary meaning. Id. The court further
emphasized that courts are not always concerned with the general public's understanding, but
often only concerned with a segment of consumers. Id. The court stated that Centaur only
must show that a substantial segment of the public that consumes the product that bears the
plaintiff's mark made the requisite association between the product and the plaintiff. Id. at
1222.
36. Id. In identifying six factors that indicate secondary meaning, the Second Circuit in
Centaur relied on a prior decision in which the Second Circuit first collected the various
precedents that discussed the question of secondary meaning. See id. (discussing precedent for
six factor test); see also Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir.
1985) (listing factors that courts should consider in determining whether mark has acquired
secondary meaning).
37. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1222.
38. Id. at 1225.
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that three factors supported the district court's holding that Centaur's mark
had acquired secondary meaning.39 The Second Circuit determined that A/
S/M's intentional copying of Centaur's mark constituted the most persuasive
secondary meaning factor 0 The Centaur court maintained that Centaur
had produced evidence which proved that A/S/M knowingly had copied
Centaur's mark. 4' In particular, the Second Circuit noted that Centaur had
shown that A/S/M's executive vice-president and principal stockholder
possessed copies of Marketing Week, that Centaur and A/S/M previously
had discussed a joint video venture, and that A/S/M had failed to provide
a credible explanation for A/S/M's decision to change the title of ADWEEK
National Marketing Edition to ADWEEK's Marketing Week. 42 Thus, the
Second Circuit determined that A/S/M intentionally had copied Centaur's
mark. 
43
In addition to determining that A/S/M's intentional copying of Cen-
taur's mark indicated that Centaur's mark had acquired secondary meaning,
the Second Circuit determined that the duration and exclusivity of Centaur's
use of the mark "Marketing Week" also indicated "Marketing Week" had
acquired secondary meaning. 4 The Second Circuit found that Centaur
exclusively had used "Marketing Week" as Centaur's mark until A/S/M
changed the title of "ADWEEK National Marketing Edition" to "AD-
WEEK's Marketing Week" in September 1986. 41 Noting that no absolute
time span controls the result of a court's secondary meaning analysis, the
Centaur court explained that a court instead should evaluate the length and
exclusivity of a mark's use in light of the plaintiff's product and the mark's
consumers." The Second Circuit reasoned that the relatively small size of
Centaur's American market, as well as the developing relations between
American and British advertising and marketing communities, indicated that
Centaur's use of the mark in a small market was more significant than if
Centaur had used the mark in a large market. 47 The Second Circuit further
reasoned that the significance of Centaur's use of the mark in a small
market increased consumers' association of Centaur's mark with Marketing
39. See id. at 1222-25 (discussing importance of intentional copying, duration and
exclusivity of plaintiff's use of mark, and significance of plaintiff's advertising expenditures);
infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur court's secondary meaning
analysis). In Centaur the Second Circuit carefully analyzed three additional factors to determine
secondary meaning. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1223-24. The three additional factors were consumer
studies linking the mark "Marketing Week" with Centaur, Centaur's sales success in the
United States, and unsolicited media coverage of Marketing Week. Id. The Centaur court
determined that these three factors supported the finding that Centaur's mark "Marketing
Week" had acquired secondary meaning. Id.
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Week.48 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that Centaur's length and
exclusivity of use constituted a second factor which indicated that Centaur's
mark had acquired secondary meaning.
49
The third secondary meaning factor that the Second Circuit found
persuasive was the significance of Centaur's advertising expenditures. 0 While
conceding that Centaur's advertising expenditures were relatively modest,
the Second Circuit determined that Centaur's advertising activities were
effective in causing the relevant group of consumers to associate Marketing
Week with Centaur. 5' The court explained that the test of secondary meaning
is not the amount of the expenditure that a plaintiff uses to create secondary
meaning, but the expenditure's effectiveness in creating secondary meaning.
2
Thus, after analyzing A/S/M's intentional copying of Centaur's mark, the
duration and exclusivity of use of Centaur's mark, and the significance of
Centaur's advertising expenditures, the Second Circuit concluded that Cen-
taur's mark "Marketing Week" had acquired secondary meaning.53
After determining that Centaur's mark "Marketing Week" had acquired
secondary meaning and, therefore, had become a protectible property in-
terest under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the Second Circuit considered
whether A/S/M had infringed on Centaur's interest by using the mark
"ADWEEK's Marketing Week." 54 The court explained that, to prove trade-
mark infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1222; see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's
analysis of Centaur's advertising expenditures).
51. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1222. In determining that Centaur's advertising expenditures
indicated that Centaur's mark "Marketing Week" had acquired secondary meaning, the Second
Circuit in Centaur explained that Centaur's advertising efforts were relatively modest compared
to other advertising campaigns. Id. The court, however, stated that Centaur's publicizing of
Marketing Week by other means added importance to Centaur's advertising expenditures. Id.
The court found that, during the most recent three years, Centaur had mailed brochures to
the top 100 American advertising agencies and that Centaur's senior director had traveled
twice a year for the previous eight years to make sales presentations to advertising agencies
and the media. Id. The court explained that, while the senior director had undertaken these
trips for the purpose of selling advertising space, the trips were advertising expenditures because
the trips served to put Marketing Week before the relevant group of consumers. Id. Similarly,
the court found that Marketing Week's appearance in a source guide to European marketing
and advertising was also the functional equivalent of advertising because the publishers of the
guide distributed the guide to people involved in advertising and marketing. Id. The court also
found significant the fact that Centaur produced a video guide to British advertising agencies,
many of which were overseas offices of American agencies. Id. Additionally, the court
emphasized that Centaur had sponsored, under the "Marketing Week" title, various conferences
featuring speakers from American advertising agencies and companies. Id. Finally, the court
placed importance on the fact that, in recent years, Centaur had generated up to $250,000 in
revenues from United States advertisers buying space in Marketing Week. Id.
52. Id. at 1223.
53. Id. at 1225; see supra note 39 (discussing additional factors that Centaur court
considered in holding that Centaur's mark had acquired secondary meaning).
54. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1225-29.
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show that the defendant's mark is likely to mislead or simply confuse an
appreciable number of consumers as to the source of the defendant's goods
bearing the plaintiff's trademark.55 To determine whether A/S/M's mark
created confusion as to the source of A/S/M's product, the Centaur court
applied a multifactor balancing testA6 Specifically, the court considered the
following eight factors to determine likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength
of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the plaintiff's
and defendant's marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the plaintiff's and
defendant's products; (4) the likelihood that the senior user of the mark
will enter the market in which the junior user is operating;57 (5) evidence
of consumers' actual confusion of the plaintiff's and defendant's products;
(6) the junior user's bad faith vel non in adopting the mark; (7) the quality
of the junior user's product; and (8) the sophistication of the relevant
consumer group. 8 In identifying these eight factors, the Second Circuit
noted that the list is not exclusive.
59
After identifying eight factors that courts should employ to determine
the likelihood of confusion, the Second Circuit reasoned that five factors
supported the district court's finding that A/S/M's use of the mark "Mar-
keting Week" would confuse the source of Centaur's and A/S/M's business
magazines.6 The Centaur court first determined that the strength of Cen-
55. Id. at 1225.
56. Id.
57. Id. In using the terms "senior user" and "junior user," the Second Circuit in
Centaur referred to the senior user as the party who first places a mark in a market. See id.
The Second Circuit referred to the junior user as a party who subsequently uses the same
mark. Id.; see infra note 71 (discussing Centaur court's use of "senior user" and "junior
user").
58. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1225. In identifying eight factors that courts should analyze to
determine whether a defendant's use of a particular mark is likely to confuse consumers as to
the source of the defendant's product, the Second Circuit in Centaur relied on an eight factor
balancing test that Judge Friendly set forth in a previous Second Circuit decision. See id.
(discussing Second Circuit precedent for determining likelihood of confusion); see also Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (asserting that courts should
use multifactor balancing test to determine likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement
suits), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820. Moreover, the Centaur court identified three other likelihood
of confusion factors. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1228 n.2. The court stated that, in previous cases,
the court also has considered the nature of the senior user's priority, the senior user's delay
in asserting the senior user's claim, and the balance of harm and benefit that would result
from granting an injunction against the junior user's use of a mark. Id.; see infra note 60
(discussing Centaur court's analysis of Centaur's priority of use of mark "Marketing Week"
and Centaur's lack of delay in asserting claim against A/S/M).
59. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1228 n.2.
60. See id. at 1225-28 (applying eight factor balancing test to determine likelihood of
confusion). In addition to employing an eight factor balancing test to determine likelihood of
confusion, the Second Circuit in Centaur also considered the nature of the senior user's
priority and Centaur's delay in asserting Centaur's claim. Id. at 1228 n.2. The court determined
that Centaur's priority in the use of the mark is rather weak due to the limited sales of
Marketing Week in the United States. Id. The court concluded, however, that the court must
view the importance of Centaur's priority in light of Centaur's minimal efforts and the small
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taur's mark indicated that A/S/M's use of the mark "Marketing Week"
likely would confuse consumers as to the source of A/S/M's magazine. 6'
The Centaur court explained that the strength of a plaintiff's mark is the
mark's tendency to identify the goods that the plaintiff sells as originating
from a particular source, even if consumers do not know the source. 62 In
examining the strength of the mark "Marketing Week" in the commercial
context in which Centaur used the mark, the Centaur court considered the
size of circulation of the magazine Marketing Week and consumer associ-
ation of the mark "Marketing Week" with a particular source. 6 Although
recognizing that Marketing Week had been in circulation a comparatively
short time with modest sales, the Centaur court determined that Marketing
Week had circulated in a small market that did not require a large circulation
base to acquire consumer identification of the mark with a particular
source. 64 The court reasoned that the small size of Centaur's market, together
with Centaur's various promotional activities, indicated that consumers in
the market would associate Centaur's mark with Centaur and thus would
be more likely to confuse the source of Centaur's and A/S/M's magazines. 6
Accordingly, the court concluded that the mark "Marketing Week" had
achieved significant strength in the mark's market.
In addition to determining that the strength of Centaur's mark indicated
that consumers likely would confuse the source of Centaur's and A/S/M's
magazines, the Second Circuit determined that the similarity of Centaur's
mark and A/S/M's mark presented a potential for consumer confusion. 67
The Centaur court stated that, in determining the similarity of Centaur's
and A/S/M's marks, a court should analyze the impression the respective
marks convey to the purchasing public. 6 The court explained that the size,
layout, design, and logotype of Centaur's and A/S/M's marks were quite
similar and thus created a strong indication that consumers likely would
confuse the source of the two marks. 69
size of the relevant market. Id. Moreover, in concluding that Centaur did not delay in asserting
Centaur's rights, the Centaur court found that Centaur's priority in using the mark "Marketing
Week" and Centaur's lack of delay in asserting its claim supported a likelihood of confusion.
Id.
61. Id. at 1225-26.
62. Id. at 1225. In defining the strength of a trademark, the Second Circuit in Centaur
stated that the degree of a mark's strength depends in part upon whether the mark is generic,
descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary and fanciful. Id. Thus, the court explained that, because
"Marketing Week" is a descriptive mark, "Marketing Week" by definition is a weak trade-
mark. Id. at 1225-26. The court, however, maintained that a mark's category does not control
whether secondary meaning has attached to a mark. Id. at 1226.






69. Id. In Centaur A/S/M contended that the presence of "ADWEEK" in A/S/M's
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After determining that the strength of Centaur's mark and the mark's
similarity with A/S/M's mark likely would confuse consumers as to the
source of the marks, the Second Circuit determined that the competitive
proximity of the plaintiff's and defendant's products further indicated that
consumers likely would confuse the source of the marks. 70 The court
explained that, in analyzing the competitive proximity of the parties' prod-
ucts, courts should examine the likelihood of whether consumers mistakenly
would associate the junior user's goods with the senior user or assume that
the senior user produced the junior user's goods.7 1 The court further
explained that a court should measure competitive proximity, in part, with
reference to the strength of a plaintiff's mark and the degree of similarity
between a plaintiff's mark and a defendant's mark.72 The court reasoned
that, because Centaur's and A/S/M's magazines are high quality weekly
marketing news publications, consumers who are interested in American
marketing news might assume that Centaur had decided to create a different
magazine that primarily focused on American marketing news. 73 Accord-
ingly, the Centaur court concluded that the competitive proximity between
Centaur's and A/S/M's magazines supported the finding that consumers
likely could have confused ADWEEK's Marketing Week with Centaur's
publication. 74
The Centaur court also determined that Centaur's intention to compete
in the American market and the equal quality of Centaur's and A/S/M's
marks were additional factors indicating that consumers would confuse the
source of Centaur's and A/S/M's magazines.7 5 The Centaur court deter-
mined that the changing nature of the market for British and American
marketing news supported the district court's finding that Centaur had
shown a clear intention to publish an edition of the magazine with an
title distinguished A/S/M's title from Centaur's title. Id. The Centaur court reasoned that,
although the titles were not identical, given the size and logotype of "ADWEEK," the mark
did not occupy a significant place in the title. Id. Thus, the court concluded that A/S/M had
not shown that the titles of A/S/M's and Centaur's magazines were distinct. Id.
70. Id. at 1226-27.
71. Id. at 1226. In using the terms "senior user" and "junior user," the Second Circuit
in Centaur referred to the plaintiff, Centaur, as the senior user and the defendant, A/S/M,
as the junior user. Id. Accordingly, the senior user of a mark is the party who first places a




74. Id. at 1227.
75. Id. at 1227-28. In determining that Centaur intended to compete in the American
market, the Second Circuit in Centaur used the phrase "bridging the gap" to refer to the
likelihood of whether the senior user of the mark will enter the market in which the junior
user is operating. Id. at 1227. The court stated that the senior user of a mark can establish a
future likelihood of confusion as to the source of the senior user's products by proving that
the senior user intends to bridge the gap. Id. The court explained that trademark laws protect
a senior user's interest in being able to enter a related field in the future without having to
worry whether a junior user is using the senior user's mark. Id.
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American focus. 7 6 Moreover, the Centaur court noted that, as a result of
the increasing number of British agencies that have acquired American
agencies and the increasing number of American agencies that have estab-
lished overseas offices, the British and American markets increasingly over-
lap. 77 Accordingly, the court concluded that Centaur's incentive to enter the
American market would increase as market barriers became easier to sur-
mount. 7 Finally, in finding that the equal quality of Centaur's and A/S/
M's marks indicated that consumers would confuse the source of the two
marks, the Second Circuit noted that the parties did not dispute the finding
that ADWEEK's Marketing Week was a product of high quality.79 The
court explained that the lack of a marked difference in quality between
goods supports the inference that the goods have the same source and,
therefore, increases the likelihood that consumers would confuse the source
of Centaur's and A/S/M's magazines.8 0 Thus, after determining that the
plaintiff's mark had acquired secondary meaning and that consumers likely
would confuse the source of Centaur's and A/S/M's marks, the Second
Circuit held that Centaur had a protectible interest in the mark "Marketing
Week" and that A/S/M infringed that interest by using the mark "AD-
WEEK's Marketing Week."'"
In holding that A/S/M had infringed Centaur's mark "Marketing
Week," the Second Circuit in Centaur applied two separate multifactor
76. Id. at 1227. In Centaur the Second Circuit found that Centaur and A/S/M had
discussed the possibility of Centaur acquiring A/S/M and that Centaur had internal discussions
about publishing an edition of Marketing Week with an expanded section covering American
marketing news. Id. Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that Centaur intended to publish a
Marketing Week edition with an American focus. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1228.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1229. In his concurring opinion in Centaur District Judge Sprizzo agreed that
the district court correctly applied the secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion factors
to the Centaur facts. Id. at 1230 (Sprizzo, J., concurring). Justice Sprizzo, however, disagreed
with the Second Circuit's apparent view that a proper analysis of the factors is a recital of a
series of formulas. Id. Justice Sprizzo noted that the majority in Centaur had characterized
reaching a proper conclusion in a trademark case as similar to Ali Baba's recitation of "Open
Sesame" in order to open the door to the treasure cave of the Forty Thieves. Id. Justice
Sprizzo argued that, by encouraging district court judges to perceive their function in a
mechanistic fashion, th? majority will not aid or enhance a proper resolution of future cases
that raise the secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion issues. Id.
Justice Sprizzo arguably misread the court's characterization of the court's analysis. In
applying the secondary meaning factors, the Centaur majority stated that no single factor was
determinative, and that a plaintiff need not prove every element. Id. at 1222. Furthermore, in
applying the likelihood of confusion factors, the court explained that the list of likelihood of
confusion factors is nonexclusive. Id. at 1228 n.2. These statements indicate that the majority
in Centaur did not advocate the use of a rigid formula for analyzing secondary meaning or
likelihood of confusion. See supra notes 34-80 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur
court's flexible approach to applying secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion factors).
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tests to determine secondary meaning and the likelihood of confusion. 2 In
considering whether a plaintiff successfully has proven descriptive trademark
infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, most courts similarly
have applied multifactor tests to determine secondary meaning and likelihood
of confusion.8 3 In particular, courts agree that evidence concerning a defen-
dant's intention to copy an owner's mark is an important factor in analyzing
secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion. 84 Courts, however, do not
agree on whether intentional copying of a plaintiff's mark conclusively
proves that a defendant infringed on a plaintiff's trademark.85
82. Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1222-29; see supra notes 34-81 and accompanying text (discussing
Centaur court's application of separate multifactor tests for determining secondary meaning
and likelihood of confusion).
83. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 923-28 (10th Cir. 1986)
(considering secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion factors to determine whether
defendant's use of term "beer nuts" constituted trademark infringement); M. Kramer Mfg.
Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 447-50 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion factors to determine whether defendant infringed on plaintiff's trade
dress of video poker game); Co-Rect Products, Inc. v. Marvy! Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d
1324, 1330-33 (8th Cir. 1985) (considering secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion
factors to determine whether defendant infringed on plaintiff's advertising phrase); Levi Strauss
& Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985) (considering secondary meaning
and likelihood of confusion factors to determine whether garment manufacturer infringed
another's alleged trademark in pocket shirt tab); Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753
F.2d 208, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion
factors to determine whether defendant's use of mark "SportsGel" infringed on plaintiff's
mark "SportsCreme"); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1529-36 (4th Cir. 1984)
(considering secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion factors to determine whether
defendant's use of mark "Pizzeria Uno" infringed on plaintiff's mark "Pizzeria Uno");
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 793-97 (5th Cir. 1983)
(considering secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion factors to determine whether
defendant's use of marks "fish fry" and "chicken fry" infringed on plaintiffs marks "Fish-
Fri" and "Chick-Fri"); President & Trustees of Colby College v. Colby College-N.H., 508
F.2d 804, 807-812 (Ist Cir. 1975) (considering secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion
factors in action to enjoin defendant's use of "Colby College-New Hampshire").
84. See Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating that proof of intentional copying is probative evidence of secondary meaning in trade
dress infringement action); Co-Rect Products, Inc. v. Marvy! Advertising Photography, Inc.,
780 F.2d 1324, 1332 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that intentional copying is relevant factor in
court's determination of secondary meaning); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Concord Beverage Co.,
629 F. Supp. 200, 211-13 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (considering defendant's intentional adoption of
mark in determining secondary meaning in descriptive trademark action), aff'd, 808 F.2d 291
(3d Cir. 1986); Orion Pictures Co. v. Dell Publishing Co., 471 F. Supp. 392, 395-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (considering intent of defendant to determine secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion in unfair competition action); In re Sneakers With Fabric Uppers & Rubber Soles,
223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 536, 539 (U.S.I.T.C. 1983) (recognizing importance of deliberate and
close imitation in determining secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion in common-law
trademark infringement proceeding); Scholl, Inc. v. Tops E.H.R. Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
754, 758-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (considering intent of defendant to determine secondary meaning
and likelihood of confusion in trade dress action); Philip Morris, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 292-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (considering importance of
defendant's intentional copying in secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion analyses).
85. Compare Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1222-
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In considering whether a plaintiff's trademark has acquired secondary
meaning under section 43(a) or whether a plaintiff has proven likelihood of
confusion under section 43(a), some courts have determined that intentional
copying constitutes conclusive evidence of secondary meaning and likelihood
of confusion.16 For example, in M. Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews 7
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether a defendant's deliberate copying of a plaintiff's trade dress pre-
sumptively could establish secondary meaning.88 The plaintiff in M. Kramer
manufactured a computer video poker game entitled "Hi-Lo Double Up
Joker Poker." ' 9 To compete with the plaintiff, the defendant, Andrews,
developed and sold a similar computer video poker game. 9° Maintaining
29 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering intentional copying in addition to other factors to determine
secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion) and Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe
Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 859 (l1th Cir. 1983) (refusing to substitute finding of intentional copying
for proof that secondary meaning had attached to plaintiff's mark) with M. Kramer Mfg. Co.
v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant's intentional copying
of trade dress conclusively proved that defendant infringed plaintiff's trade dress); see supra
notes 40-53 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur court's analysis of intentional copying
in addition to other factors to determine whether secondary meaning had attached to plaintiff's
mark); infra notes 100-112 and accompanying text (discussing Brooks court's refusal to
substitute finding of intentional copying for proof of secondary meaning); infra notes 86-98
and accompanying text (discussing M. Kramer court's determination that defendant infringed
plaintiff's trade dress on finding that defendant intentionally copied plaintiff's trade dress).
86. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding
secondary meaning from defendant's intentional copying of plaintiff's trade dress); Transgo,
Inc. v. AJAC Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1016 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that
proof of exact copying, without any opposing proof, can be sufficient to establish secondary
meaning), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); Harlequin Enters. v. Gulf & Western Corp.,
644 F.2d 946, 950 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that defendant's attempt to capitalize on plaintiff's
product constitutes sufficient evidence of secondary meaning); Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme
Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that deliberate imitation can be
substitute for secondary meaning); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314
F.2d 149, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1963) (deliberate copier of mark indicated that copier expects
confusion and resultant profit), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830; Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High
Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 1960) (stating that copier of mark
attempted to realize upon secondary meaning already in existence through precise copying);
Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., 451 F. Supp. 555, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(presuming likelihood of confusion from defendant's intent to cause confusion); E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 545, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (recognizing that defendant's deliberate attempt to confuse consumers can act as substitute
for secondary meaning); Clairol, Inc. v. Cosway Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 583, 586 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (stating that defendant's deliberate imitation of plaintiff's trade dress is sufficient
to establish secondary meaning); see also infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text (discussing
M. Kramer court's finding of secondary meaning from defendant's intentional copying of
plaintiff's trade dress).
87. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
88. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986). Courts refer
to a products "trade dress" as the product's label, package, and perhaps display card. I J.T.
McCARTHY, supra note 4, § 8.1, at 282.
89, M. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 425.
90. Id. at 428.
DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONS
that Andrews infringed on the plaintiff's trade dress by copying the console
in which the plaintiff housed its game, the artwork on the glass panel upon
which the plaintiff displayed its video graphics, and the name "Hi-Lo
Double Up Joker Poker," the plaintiff in M. Kramer brought a section
43(a) trade dress infringement suit against Andrews. 91
At trial before the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, the plaintiff contended that Andrews' intentional copying of the
plaintiff's video game console proved that the plaintiff's console had ac-
quired secondary meaning. 92 Finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove
that the plaintiff's console design indicated to the public that the plaintiff's
and the defendant's video poker games originated from the same source,
the district court held that secondary meaning had not attached to the
plaintiff's console and, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's trade dress in-
fringement suit.3 Arguing that proof of a defendant's intentional copying
of a plaintiff's trade dress satisfies the requirement of secondary meaning,
the plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit.9 4
On appeal the Fourth Circuit initially rejected the defendant's contention
that evidence of copying is insufficient to establish secondary meaning. 9s
The Fourth Circuit explained that, if a defendant copies a competitor's
trade dress, the defendant probably intended to appropriate some commer-
cial advantage or benefit that the competitor derived from the use of the
competitor's mark. 96 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit determined that evi-
dence of intentional copying establishes a prima facie case of secondary
meaning sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to a defendant to prove
that a plaintiff's product had not acquired secondary meaning.97 Because
the defendants had not offered credible evidence rebutting the presumption
that the defendants intentionally copied the plaintiff's trade dress, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the district court's holding that evidence of a defendant's
intentional copying of a plaintiff's product did not prove that a plaintiff's
product had acquired secondary meaning.98
In contrast to the M. Kramer court's determination that intentional
copying alone can create an inference of secondary meaning, most courts,
like the Centaur court, have determined that intentional copying constitutes
important but not conclusive evidence that a mark has acquired secondary
meaning. 99 For example, in Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Suave Shoe
91. Id. at 447.
92. See id. at 431-32 (discussing procedural history of M. Kramer).
93. See id. at 447 (noting district court's holding that secondary meaning had not
attached to plaintiff's console).
94. See id. at 447-50 (considering whether proof of defendant's intentional copying
conclusively proves secondary meaning).
95. Id. at 448.
96. Id. at 449.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 450.
99. See Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1225-29
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Corp.' ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether proof of intentional copying is adequate to establish
secondary meaning. 10 1 In Brooks the plaintiff sold athletic shoes with a "V"
design on the side of each shoe. °m Six years after the plaintiff first began
selling shoes with the "V" design, the defendant began manufacturing a
line of athletic and leisure shoes that had a similar "V" design on the side
of each shoe. 03 Subsequently, the plaintiff brought an unfair competition
action alleging that the defendant had violated section 43(a) by selling shoes
with the "V" design.104 After a bench trial, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida found that the defendant intentionally
had copied the plaintiff's "V" design.105 The district court, however, refused
to grant relief to the plaintiff because the plaintiff failed to prove through
other evidence that the plaintiff's trade dress had acquired secondary mean-
ing.11 6 Arguing that the district court erroneously refused to hold that proof
of intentional copying establishes secondary meaning as a matter of law,
the plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. 0 7
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit in Brooks initially recognized that some
courts have indicated that proof of certain egregious conduct by a defendant
is sufficient to establish secondary meaning. 08 While noting that intentional
copying is probative evidence on the secondary meaning issue, the Eleventh
Circuit expressly rejected the plaintiff's argument that intentional copying
conclusively establishes that the plaintiff's trademark or trade dress has
acquired secondary meaning.' °9 The Brooks court reasoned that close copying
does not necessarily indicate that a defendant has attempted to capitalize
on the secondary meaning of a plaintiff's trademark." 0 The Eleventh Circuit
(2d Cir. 1987) (considering factors in addition to defendant's intent to determine secondary
meaning and likelihood of confusion); Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 506
(5th Cir. 1980) (stating that defendant's intent to deceive buyers is merely one factor courts
should consider in determining existence of secondary meaning or likelihood of confusion);
RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1060 (2d Cir. 1979) (considering other
factors in addition to defendant's conscious imitation to determine secondary meaning); Ralston
Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 134-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (considering
other factors in addition to defendant's intent to determine secondary meaning); see also supra
notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur court's analysis of intentional copying
and secondary meaning).
100. 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983).
101. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 1983).
102. Id. at 856.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 81 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
aff'd, 716 F.2d 854 (l1th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. at 82. In refusing to grant relief to the plaintiff, the district court in Brooks
reasoned that a defendant's intentional copying does not relieve a plaintiff from having to
prove that secondary meaning has attached to the plaintiff's mark. Id.
107. See Brooks, 716 F.2d at 857 (discussing procedural history of Brooks).
108. Id. at 859.
109. Id. at 860.
110. Id.
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explained that the defendant may have had other reasons for copying the
plaintiff's design besides confusing consumers as to the source of the
defendant's goods."' Refusing to adopt the rule that intentional copying
eliminates the plaintiff's burden of proving secondary meaning, the Eleventh
Circuit accordingly affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
section 43(a) unfair competition suit. 12
The Brooks and Centaur courts' determination that courts should con-
sider other factors besides intentional copying to find secondary meaning
best promotes the purposes of the Lanham Act."3 In enacting the Lanham
Act, Congress' primary purpose was to prevent sellers from confusing buyers
as to the source of the seller's products." 4 To prevail in a section 43(a)
infringement action, a plaintiff must prove that, as a result of a defendant's
use of the plaintiff's mark, consumers are likely to confuse the source of
the plaintiff's and defendant's goods.". To show that consumers are likely
to confuse the source of the plaintiff's and defendant's goods, a plaintiff
first must prove through reliable evidence that buyers associate the plaintiff's
mark with the plaintiff." 6 A finding of intentional copying is probative of
whether consumers associate the plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff because
precise copying implies that a defendant was attempting to capitalize on an
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. (refusing to substitute finding of intentional copying for secondary meaning);
Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1222-25 (2d Cir. 1987)
(considering factors in addition to intentional copying to determine whether secondary meaning
had attached to plaintiff's mark); supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (discussing
Brooks court's reasoning that courts should not substitute intentional copying for requirement
of secondary meaning); supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur court's
analysis of factors in addition to intentional copying to find secondary meaning); infra notes
114-120 and accompanying text (discussing consistency of Brooks and Centaur courts' holdings
with purposes of Lanham Act).
114. See Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 215 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that central purpose of Lanham Act was to make possible choice between competing
articles by enabling buyers to distinguish one seller's goods from another seller's goods); 1
J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 4, § 15.5, at 677 (stating that fundamental purpose of trademark
law and unfair competition law is to prevent confusion of buyers); see also supra note I and
accompanying text (discussing purposes of Lanham Act).
115. See Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 213 (stating that ultimate inquiry in trademark
infringement actions is whether purchasers are likely to confuse source of plaintiff's and
defendant's goods); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.
1978) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); supra note 6 (listing courts that require
plaintiff to prove consumers are likely to confuse source of plaintiff's and defendant's goods
to prevail in § 43(a) infringement action).
116. See Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 213 n.9 (stating that, before court can determine
whether consumers are likely to confuse source of plaintiff's and defendant's goods, court
must initially determine whether plaintiff's mark has acquired secondary meaning and, there-
fore, eligible for protection); supra note 5 (listing courts which state that courts first must
determine existence of secondary meaning before analyzing whether consumers are likely to
confuse source of plaintiff's and defendant's goods); 1 J.T. McCAirnnr, supra note 4, § 15.5,
at 677 (stating that plaintiff must prove secondary meaning in order to prove likelihood of
confusion).
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:335
existing secondary meaning. 17 If consumers do not associate a plaintiff's
mark with the plaintiff, however, a defendant's intentional copying of the
plaintiff's mark cannot confuse consumers as to the source of the plaintiff's
goods."" The Brooks and Centaur courts' analyses correctly recognize that
the intent of a defendant is irrelevant if consumers do not associate a
plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff's products." 9 By recognizing that inten-
tional copying is probative but not conclusive evidence of secondary mean-
ing, the Brooks and Centaur courts' determinations promote the purpose
of the Lanham Act to impose liability only if actual consumer confusion
exists. 120
In contrast to the Brooks and Centaur courts' determinations that
intentional copying does not establish secondary meaning, the M. Kramer
court's determination that intentional copying alone establishes secondary
meaning fails to achieve the purpose of the Lanham Act.' 2' The M. Kramer
court justified the inference of secondary meaning from evidence that a
defendant consciously imitated a plaintiff's mark on the expectation that a
defendant would not adopt a feature without intending to confuse consum-
ers.' 22 The M. Kramer court, however, failed to realize that copying does
not necessarily indicate that a defendant is attempting to trade on a
117. See Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 558 (9th
Cir. 1960) (stating that no logical reason exists for precise copying save an attempt to realize
upon secondary meaning in existence); I J.T. McCTAxR, supra note 4, § 15.5, at 677 (stating
that courts should not substitute proof of egregious conduct for secondary meaning, but rather
as a piece of evidence to prove that consumer recognition and secondary meaning in fact
exists).
118. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that courts
must determine whether secondary meaning exists before determining whether consumers are
likely to confuse source of plaintiff's and defendant's goods).
119. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text (discussing consistency of Brooks
and Centaur courts' analyses with irrelevance of defendant's intent in determining trademark
infringement); Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 291 F.2d 302, 304 (2d
Cir. 1961) (Moore, J., dissenting) (stating that intent of defendant is irrelevant if consumers
are not likely to confuse plaintiff's and defendant's restaurant names), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
889; 1 J.T. McCATHY, supra note 4, § 15.5, at 677 (stating that courts can achieve fundamental
purpose of trademark law, to prevent confusion of buyers, by requiring that plaintiff prove
that consumers associate plaintiff's mark with particular source).
120. See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text (discussing Brooks and Centaur
courts' promotion of purposes of Lanham Act).
121. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that intentional copying can be substitute for secondary meaning requirement); infra notes
122-130 and accompanying text (analyzing M. Kramer court's failure to consider goals of
Lanham Act).
122. M. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 449; accord Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F.
Supp. 466, 486 (D. Neb. 1981) (stating that court may infer existence of secondary meaning
from evidence that defendant consciously has imitated nonfunctional design features of
plaintiff's product); American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 562-
63 (2d Cir. 1953) (stating that intentional copier thinks that copier will confuse consumers by
plagiarizing mark, therefore, court accepts copier's forecast that copier is likely to succeed).
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plaintiff's reputation or good will.'2 Persons may have other motivations
for choosing a particular mark.124 For example, a defendant may copy a
mark not to confuse consumers but to use a mark that the defendant
reasonably believes is merely functional, commonplace, or in the public
domain.' In fact, a defendant may use similar or even identical marks on
products different from a senior user so long as no consumer confusion
exists.'1 Furthermore, the M. Kramer court failed to recognize that exact
copying of items in the public domain is legal. 27 By holding that intentional
copying constitutes sufficient evidence for a finding of secondary meaning,
the Fourth Circuit in M. Kramer did not require a showing that secondary
meaning in fact exists before finding that consumers likely would confuse
the source of a plaintiff's and a defendant's products.'2 The Fourth Circuit
failed to realize that consumers cannot confuse a plaintiff's and a defen-
dant's product if consumers do not associate the plaintiff's mark with the
plaintiff. 129 By circumventing the secondary meaning requirement, the Fourth
Circuit in M. Kramer failed to promote the primary goal of the Lanham
Act, which is to protect consumers from likelihood of confusion as to the
source of a plaintiff's and a defendant's products. 130
123. See irfra notes 124-127 and accompanying text (discussing M. Kramer court's failure
to realize that defendant's intentional copying does not necessarily indicate defendant's bad
faith).
124. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 860 (stating that
defendant may have had other motivations for copying plaintiff's mark); 1 J. GU.soN,
TRADEmARx PROTECTION "D PRACTicE, § 2.0911], at 2-84 (1988) (noting that copying always
does not indicate that defendant is attempting to trade on plaintiff's reputation or good will).
125. Cf. I J. GInsoN, .supra note 124, § 2.0911], at 2-84.1 (stating that trademark law
does not prohibit copying where copied features are merely functional, commonplace, or in
public domain).
126. See McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1139 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that defendant can use mark similar to plaintiff's mark if consumers are unlikely to
confuse source in case that involved noncompetitive goods).
127. See Brooks, 716 F.2d at 860 (noting that law does not preclude persons from exactly
copying things in the public domain); cf. B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co.,
451 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that exact copying is often a civilizing rather than
a cannibalizing folkway).
128. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that intentional copying constitutes sufficient evidence for finding of secondary meaning before
continuing analysis to determine whether defendant infringed plaintiff's trade dress); supra
notes 87-98 and accompanying text (discussing M. Kramer court's failure to require plaintiff
to provide evidence other than defendant's intentional copying to prove secondary meaning).
129. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text (discussing Brooks and Centaur
courts' recognition that courts must find secondary meaning before courts can find likelihood
of confusion).
130. See 1 J.T. McCAxrvY, supra note 4, § 2.1, at 44 (discussing trademark law's policy
of consumer protection); supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text (discussing M. Kramer
court's failure to inquire into actual consumer confusion before finding that consumers were
likely to confuse source of plaintiff's and defendant's products). In finding that proof of
intentional copying conclusively establishes secondary meaning, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
in M. Kramer arguably ignores two further purposes of the Lanham Act, which are to prevent
diversion of trade and to protect the good will of trademark holders. See supra note 1 and
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In Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications the Second
Circuit held that Centaur had a protectible interest in the mark "Marketing
Week" and that defendant A/S/M infringed that interest by using the mark
"ADWEEK's Marketing Week.' 31 The Centaur court employed separate
multifactor balancing tests in determining whether the plaintiff's mark had
acquired secondary meaning and whether consumers likely would confuse
the source of Centaur's and A/S/M's magazines. 32 In applying these
separate multifactor tests, the Second Circuit properly considered the de-
fendant's intentional copying of the plaintiff's mark. 3  The Centaur court's
rule that intentional copying constitutes probative but not conclusive evi-
dence of secondary meaning is consistent with most other United States
circuit courts of appeal. 3 4 Moreover, the Second Circuit's application of
separate multifactor tests achieves the purpose of the Lanham Act by
requiring a finding that consumers actually are confused as to the source
of a plaintiff's and a defendant's products.3 5 By considering other factors
in addition to the intentional copying factor, the Centaur court notifies
lawyers that intentional copying constitutes important but not conclusive
accompanying text (discussing purposes of Lanham Act). In determining that intentional
copying alone can establish secondary meaning, the M. Kramer court failed to consider
evidence of whether a defendant's use of a mark actually diverted trade or affected the good
will of a trademark holder. See M. Kramer, 783 F.2d 448-50 (failing to consider whether
plaintiff suffered actual loss as result of defendant's intentional copying in determination of
secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion). The M. Kramer court failed to realize that
if secondary meaning does not exist, then likelihood of confusion cannot exist. See supra notes
87-98 and accompanying text (discussing M. Kramer court's failure to require proof of actual
secondary meaning before finding likelihood of confusion). If consumers are not confused as
to the source of a plaintiff's and a defendant's products, a plaintiff does not have a protectible
interest and thus suffers no loss under trademark law. See supra notes 115-116 and accom-
panying text (noting that trademark law does not protect plaintiff when consumers are not
confused as to source of plaintiff's and defendant's products). If a plaintiff does not have a
protectible interest, a defendant cannot infringe on a plaintiff's mark. See supra notes 115-
118 and accompanying text (noting that defendant cannot infringe on plaintiff's mark when
plaintiff has no protectible interest). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in M. Kramer fails to
achieve the Lanham Act's goals of preventing diversion of trade and protecting the good will
of trademark holders by finding trademark infringement without first finding that consumers
are confusing the source of a plaintiff's and a defendant's products. See supra note I and
accompanying text (discussing goals of Lanham Act); see also supra notes 121-129 and
accompanying text (criticizing M. Kramer court's finding of trademark infringement without
finding likelihood of consumer confusion).
131. Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1229 (2d Cir.
1987).
132. See supra notes 34-81 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur court's use of
separate multifactor tests to determine secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion).
133. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur court's analysis of
defendant's intentional copying in determining secondary meaning).
134. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting courts that consider defendant's
intent as probative but not conclusive evidence on issue of secondary meaning and likelihood
of confusion).
135. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text (discussing consistency of Centaur
court's analysis of defendant's intentional copying with purposes of Lanham Act).
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evidence of trademark infringement. 136 More importantly, however, the
Second Circuit's decision in Centaur notifies district courts that trademark
law and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act are concerned with whether
consumers actually are confused as to the source of a plaintiff's and a
defendant's products and that trademark infringement decisions should not
rest upon the subjective intentions of defendants.
137
J. STEVEN PATTERSON
136. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text (discussing importance of intentional
copying factor in trademark infringement actions).
137. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text (discussing Centaur court's refusal
to find secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion solely on defendant's intentional
copying).
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